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by 
Robario G. Manafcan* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobt developing countries offer tax concessions ,to 
promote investments, in general, and to direct, resource's 
into Selected iactivitieS and/or locations, in particular, 
Th.e ASEAN countries are no exception to thi^ "rule". 
Investment incentive's, per be, in ASEAN countries are 
usually designed to provide equal inducements to qualified 
foreign and domestic investor's. Moreover, all countrj.es'in 
the aggrupation with the exception of Singapore impoSe 
certain limitations on foreign equity participatipn in 
domestic activities, TheSe regulations are further 
1/ 
modified by .performance requirements and titration lawS. 
Research Fellow, Philippine inStitutpfor Development 
studies. 
The viewS expressed in this Study are thoSe of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect thoke of the 
Institute. 
However, it apparent that there iS a conSciouS effort on 
the part of most developing countries, the ASEAN countries 
included, to attract foreign direct investment. ThuS, all 
ASEAN countries Supplement their tax incentives with various 
guarantees covering expropriation, loSSeS due to 
nationalization, war, and inconvertibility of currency, 
remittances of profits, dividends and interest payments, and 
repatriation of capital (See Annex Table 1). It haS been 
observed that countries, particularly thoSe in the Same 
I 
geographical area, engage in Some form of competition for 
foreign capital by trying to outbid each other in termS of 
providing more generous investment incentives than their 
neighbors (Shah and Toye, 1978). Recent reforms in the area 
of investment incentives undertaken by Some ASEAN member 
countries and the concomitant policy diScuSSions attest to 
this. 
Given this perspective, there appears to be a need to 
review the investment incentives of the ASEAN Countries for 
the purpose of asSeSSing the.ir competitiveness from the 
point of view of individual investors. To achieve this, 
this paper will attempt to quantify the impact of the 
investment incentives on the profitability of prospective 
projects. Specifically, this Study will quantify the effect 
of the incentive provisions of the different countries on 
the interi ate of return of hypothetical projects.. This 
approach, in effect, fineSSeS the largely unsettled iSSue of 
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whether tax incentives are effective or not in increasing 
the overall level of investment, or, at the very leaSt, in 
influencing the composition of total investment (Shah and 
Toye, 1978; GalenSon, 1984). 
On another vein, optimum tax theory Suggests that 
investment incentives Should be neutral with regards to both 
production and consumption choices. In this light, a number 
of scholars have expressed concern over the unintended 
distortion introduced by tax incentives and the resulting 
reduction in the overall level of economic efficiency 
(Williamson, 1971; ILO, 1974; Power and BautiSta, 1979). 
They have pointed that a number of investment incentives are 
non-neutral in their treatment of capital and labor. Jn 
particular, these incentives directly bear on the uSer coSt 
of capital. By altering relative factor prices faced by 
promoted enterprises, these incentives may adversely affect 
relative factor intensities in preferred activities. This 
Study will alSo aSSesS the impact of the investment 
incentives of ASEAN countries on the user coSt of capital. 
To Summarize, this paper will (1) provide a broad 
overview of the investment incentive schemes made available 
by ASEAN countries in the context of their overall tax 
System's; (2) appraiSe the impact of these tax incentives on 
the prof itabi l ity Of prospective investment's; and 
(3) quantify the changes induced by the investment 
2/ 
incentives on the uSer cost of capital. 
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2. NATURE OP INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN ASEAN COUNTRIES 
Various writer's have experimented with different 
clarification Schemed in analyzing investment incentives. 
Some have grouped incentives according to (1) whether or 
not their SubSidy equivalent is Some function of the Scale 
of the capital outlay; 1 and (2) whether or not their SubSidy 
equivalent iS 'some function of the level of the enterprise's 
profits . Others haVe focuSed on whether the benefits 
obtainable from the incentives are made available up front 
at the Start of the project or are Spread out over an 
extended period. TheSe distinctions are helpful in 
deciphering both the usefulness of the incentives from the 
point of view of the individual investors and the biaSeS 
inherent in particular forms of incentives. 
Annex Table 2 presents the tax concessions offered by 
the ASEAN countries. All countries in the group grant 
promoted enterprises exemption from duties and taxeS on 
imported capital equipment. It haS been noted that this 
incentive iS valuable to the firm because it iS an up front 
incentive whoSe benefits accrue to the project regardle'sS of 
the enterprise's level of profits. This incentive alSo 
provides relief from the cash flow difficulties comtaon in 
the initial year that are usually perceived to be a 
Stumbling block to the investment decision. On the other 
hand, the amount of benefit arising from this incentive 
5 
hingeS on the size of the investment outlay and is; 
therefore, biased in favor of capital uSe. 
Another capital-related incentive, the investment 
allowance, is available in three of the countries under 
Study. Malaysia provides for the additional deduction from 
taxable income of up to 100 percent of the valae of 
qualified capital expenditures of promoted activities -that 
do not enjoy pioneer StatuS while expansion projects are 
allowed a 25 percent investment allowance; Singapore 
offers an investment allowance equal to a maximum:of?50 p§r* 
cent of the value of approved capital expenSeS of promoted 
activities that are not enjoying the concessions granted to 
pioneer firms. The Philippines permits 100'percent of the 
cost of infrastructure expenditures of. registered 
enterprises locating in promoted ar£aS to be^ deductible from 
taxable income in the year they are incurred; It fehould be 
pointed out the investment allowance iS of value to the 
registered firms only if they have profits against which to 
charge it. This problem may be alleviated but-. iS not 
totally eliminated by the presence of loSS carry forward 
provisions. 
Accelerated depreciation iS granted by Malaysia (for 
investments incurred before December 31, 1988) and 
Singapore to promoted firms. Both countries permit approved 
capital expenditures to be written off in three yearS from 
date of purchase. On the other hand, accelerated 
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depreciation is a regular feature of the tax SyStemS of 
Indonesia and Thailand. This incentive, ShareS the 
shortcomings of the investment allowance aS diScuSSed above. 
Of all the ASEAN countries, only Indonesia does not 
grant an income tax holiday. The duration of the tax 
holiday offered in the other four countries^ ranges from 
three to ten yearS at the maximum. All countries allows for 
the extension of the basic tax relief period if the 
registered enterprise meets a minimum level of net foreign 
exchange earnings, a prescribed capital-labor ratio, a pre-
determined rate of indigenous raw material utilization or 
locational requirements. At the Same time, Thailand varies 
the duration of its tax holiday provision according to the 
Size of the investment or the number of jobs created by the 
promoted activity. The income tax holiday haS been 
described aS a "perverSe" type of incentive in that it 
provides little or no assistance when it iS needed moSt, 
i.e., in the initial years of operation when firms 
(especially infant industries) are likely to Suffer loSSeS 
or to make little profits. On the other hand, firmS which 
are highly profitable in the early years of its life would 
benefit the moSt from this provision. Furthermore, the 
benefits of the income tax holiday do not accrue to the 
foreign investor from a capital exporting country that taxes 
its citizens and corporations incorporated within its 
borders on a global income basis unleSS tax Sparing 
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arrangements exist between the home and the host countries. 
Tax Sparing agreements allow the foreign investor to credit 
income taxeS not .paid to the host country becauSe of the 
income tax holiday against income taxes due in the home 
country. 
L%ike other incentives whose benefits are contigent qn 
the target enterprises' profitability, the income tax 
holiday becomes more meaningful in the presence of a lcSS 
carry forward provision. All ASEAN countries §xoept the 
Philippines have included this aS a regular feature oftheir 
general . tax structures. The losS carry forward provision 
alSo minimizes the other incentives' biaS against long-term 
and high risk projects. 
Both Malaysia (to all promoted investments, in 
general) and Singapore (to a more limited degree) permit 
depreciation allowances to be deferred to; tbe poSt income 
tax holiday period. This feature of their fifteentive SyStemS 
increases the value of their tax holidays tQ^ tfee prospective 
investors. 
The Philippines iS the only country in : ths a!8&<a<Siation 
that offers an employment-based incentive. It is in the 
' r 
form of an additional deduction from taxable income, 
available in the first 5 years from the date of 
registration, of an amount equal to 50 percent of the 
incremental labor expense. However, the income tax holiday 
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provision renders this incentive redundant to a large extent. 
ASide from the exemption from or tax credit for duties 
and taxe's on raw materials used in export production that is 
generally made available in all ASEAN countries, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand grant other incentives that are 
specifically geared to the promotion of exports. Thailand 
permits exporter to deduct from taxable income an amount 
equal to 5 percent of incremental income from exports. 
Both Malaysia and Singapore allow the double deduction of 
promotional expenses for exports. In addition to this, 
Malaysia provides for the additional deduction of an amount 
equal to Some.proportion x of taxable income (where x iS 
computed aS the ratio of 50 percent of export SaleS to 
total SaleS) and 5 percent of the value of indigenous raw 
materials uSed for export production. 
Finally, all countries with the exception of Indonesia 
offer incentives to enterprises locating in preferred 
geographical areaS. 
3. IMPACT OF THE INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ON THE INTERNAL 
RATE OF RETURN 
The effect of the different incentives on the 
direction of investments may be evaluated by quantifying the 
impact of theSe incentives on Some measure of the registered 
enterprise's profitability. Implicit in this approach are 
the following assumptions: (1) entrepreneurs baSe their 
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investment decision^ on Some measure of profitability!; 
(2) they perceive additional profits attributable to the 
incentives aS Such; and (3) they react to the incentive-
induced increments in after-tax profits in the Same manner 
that they would respond to changes in the level of 
profitability arising from variations in othex economic 
variables, other things being equal. This procedure alSo 
abstracts from other factors that are not explicitly 
included in the profitability measure uSed. 
USing Survey data, Allen (1979) and LindSey (1980), 
found that pplitical and economic Stability, ,Size- and growth 
potential of the domestic market, availability of raw 
materials, etc. are the major consideration: in the 
investment decision of foreign investors. In the analysis 
undertaken, it iS alSo aSSumed that theSe important factors 
are equal in the countries under Study. 
In this paper, the concept-of the internal rate of 
return (IRR) is uSed to trace. the impact of the various 
incentives on the profitability of promoted enterprises. 
The pre-tax internal rate of return iS defined by the 
following relationship: 
u x 
I - q = 0 (1) 
j=l j 
(1+r ) 
o 
where q iS the initial outlay or the acquisition coSt of 
capital ; x iS the annual pre-tax profit Stream; r i's the 
o 
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IRR before taxeS; and, n is the life Span of the capital 
aSSet. 
On the other hand, the after-tax internal rate of 
return may be obtained from: 
(1-u)x + ud 
u j 
Z - (1 + tm) q = 0 (2) 
> l " j 
(1+r ) 
T 
where u is the income tax rate; r iS the after-tax IRR; tm 
T 
iS the tariff rate on capital; and d IS the amount of 
depreciation charges that may be deducted from groSS income 
3/ 
for tax purposes in year j. with an income tax holiday 
of n yearS, (2) becomes: 
1 
(l-u)x + ud 
n x n j 
1 + i (1 + tm) q = 0 (3) 
E j j=n +1 j 
j=l (1+r ) 1 (1+r ) 
H H 
where r iS the IRR with the tax holiday. 
H 
The exemption of capital from tariff charges reduces 
(2) into: 
(1-u) x + ud 
n j 
E - q = 0 (4) 
i-1 j 
(1+r ) 
TM 
where r iS the IRR with the duty exemption of capital. 
TM 
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Taking the investment allowance into account, the IRR 
formula can be rewritten as: 
(l-u)x + uk(l + tm)q + ud (1-u) x + ud (5) 
j n j 
+ 2 (1 + tm) q = 0 
j j=2 j 
(1+r ) (1+r ) 
IA IA 
where r iS the IRR with the investment allowance ; and, 
IA 
k iS the proportion of the acquisition coSt of capital that 
iS allowed to be deducted immediately from taxable income in 
addition to normal depreciation. 
Other additional deductions can be considered by uSing 
the following variant: 
n (1-u) x + ud + ua £ j j 
j=l - (l + tm) q = 0 (6) 
j 
(1+r ) 
D 
* 
where r iS the IRR with the additional allowable deduction; 
D 
and a is the amount of additional deduction permitted in j 
year j. 
Our procedure iS to Solve for the "with incentives'* 
IRR, uSing the different IRR formulas outlined above, given 
the value of the pre-tax profit Stream (expressed aS a 
proportion of the acquisition of capital) that will reSult 
in a before-tax IRR of 20 percent. Table 1 summarizes the 
impact of Selected investment incentives on the internal 
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Table 1 
Internal Rate of Return of a'Hypothetical Pifi 
Under Selected Incentive Scheies in ASBAH Countries, 1988 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
n=10 n=20 n-10 n=20 n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20 P i t " 
1. Regnlar Taxes 11.0 13.0 10.25 11.5 15.0 16.5 t U 5 13.25 
(no incentive) 10.0 12.5 10.25 11.1 
9.0 12.0 
2. Tai Holiday HA 16.5" 15.0 12.5 13.5 17.0 17.25 12.0 13.5J 
(•in. no. of l 9 i 0 18-75 
years allowed) 
3. Tax Holiday HA 16.75 17.0 14.1 15.0 20.0 19.0 H . O 15.0 
(•ai. no. of 2 0 < 0 ; 5 
years allowed) 
4. Duty Exeiption 15.0 16.5 12.25 12.25 13.75 H . O IA 15.0 16.5 
on Capital 14.25 ! 15.75 
13.5 15.25 
5- ( 1 M ) 15 16.5 19.35 17.35 17.5 17.0 17.0 17.25 16.5 17.0 
14.2S '15.75 19.0* 18.75 
13.5 15.25 
* \ ( J t O 1 5 16-5 20.0 19.25 19.25 18.4 20.0 19.0 19.0 18.5 
14.25 15.75 20.0 19.75 
13.5 15.25 
7. Investient HA 16.0 15.1 IA 18.0 18.25 IA 
Allowance 
Oily 
(tax. allowed) 
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Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20 a=10 n=20 n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20 
8. (7 • 4] 17.7 17.0 MA 11.0 18.25 ^ IA 
9. Export 16.5 16.0 11.5 13.5 
Allowance 
Only 
10. (2 + 4 + 9) U 20.0 19.5 U 17.0 17.5 
11. (3 + 4 + 9) U 20.0 20,0 NA 19.5 19.0 
Heto i tens: 
ta .25 .12 .2 0 .2 
o . 15/.25/.35 .40 * .05 .35 .33 .35 
The assaaed incoie streai used in these calculations is that which yields before tax IftR of .20. 
ij 
for ii = 15, 25, 351, respectively. 
b/ • 
special allowance for denreciation in tai holiday period. 
c I 
for 1001 export. 
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rate of return of a hypothetical enterprise in ASEAN 
countries. 
Singapore is the most attractive location tax-wiSe if 
no investment incentives were made available in all 
countries. The before-incentiveS but after-taxeS internal 
rate of return in Singapore is 3.5 percentage points higher 
than the ASEAN average. This iS largely due to the zero 
tariff on capital in Singapore Since its corporate income 
tax rate iS not much lower than thoSe of the other 
countries. 
The tax SyStemS of the other 4 countries are 
competitive with each other. While Malaysia haS a very high 
income tax rate relative to the others, its low tariff on 
capital equipment and its accelerated depreciation allowance 
available to all investments, in general, compensates for 
the former disadvantage. Although the Philippines and 
4 
Thailand have equal income tax rateS and tariff rates on 
capital, the tax SyStem in Thailand yields a Slightly higher 
after-tax internal rate of return becauSe of the more 
liberal treatment of depreciation there. 
After incentives are taken into account, Indonesia 
appears to be the leaSt generous. The impact of the 
totality of the major incentive provisions in the other four 
countries averaging an increment of 9 percentage points in 
the IRR, are not negligible. However, the incentives do not 
IS 
add much to the relative competitiveness of theSe countries 
except Singapore which lost Some of its edge. Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand offer roughly equal 
inducements in terms of the impact of their incentives oh 
the internal rate Of return. 
This finding SuggeStS, that the widespread practice of 
many countries of uSing investment incentives aS a bidding 
instrument to attract more foreign capital may be Self-
defeating. The analysis suggests that the ASEAN countries 
are generally equally competitive before incentives aS well 
aS after incentives. The implication is that theSe 
countries are throwing away precious government revenues in 
exchange for an edge that is largely illusory. Some form of 
cooperation amongst the ASEAN countries in this regard is, 
thus, indicated. 
It iS apparent that the income tax holiday yields 
Significant additions to the IRR (up to 6 percentage points) 
in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. The 
tax tjoliday is the Single moSt important pr-oviSion in terms 
of its effect on the internal rate of return in the firSt 
three of the above mentioned countries. In fftailand, it is 
the Second moSt important incentive, next to the duty-free 
importation of capital. Note, however, two points that bear 
on the efficacy of the income tax holiday. First, for 
firms that incur loSSeS in the early years of their 
operations, the income tax holiday may not be aS uSeful an 
16 
incentive aS our computations indicate Since. our 
hypothetical firm i& assumed to be «niforroly profitable over 
its life Span, Second, the absence of tax Sparing 
arrangements between the ASEAN and the major capital 
exporting countries like the United StateS, Japan and,- , most 
of the OECD alSo negates the potential value of this 
incentive to foreign investors. The global income concept 
uSed by theSe countries in calculating income taxeS imply 
that the benefits of the tax holiday go to the home 
countries' Treasuries rather than to the individual foreign 
investors. 
Malaysia's export allowance provision haS a Significant 
impact on the internal rate of return of .prospective 
projects when taken by itSeIf. However, when it is combined 
with the other incentives, Specifically the income tax 
holiday it becomes redundant. 
The investment allowance which Malaysia and Singapore 
grant to promoted activities in lieu of the tax holiday haS 
approximately the Same impact aS the latter on the IRRf 
4. IMPACT OF THE INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ON THE USER COST 
OF CAPITAL 
It has been observed that many incentives are capital-
uSe related and aS Such effectively diminishes capital cost. 
To evaluate the impact of investment incentives on capital 
cost the concept of the uSer coSt of capital iS uSed. 
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The uSer coSt of capital and its relationship with tax 
policy parameters is well defined ,within the neoclassical 
theory of capital accumulation which aSSumeS that firmS 
maximize the net present value of net revenue after tax 
(Hall and JorgenSon, 1967). The uSer coSt of capital or the 
implicit rental of one unit of capital Service per unit of 
time i!s defined by: 
q(i+D) (1-uk-uz) 
c = — - — (7) 
(1-u) 
where i iS the rate of. interest; D iS the rate of 
replacement of capital Stock; k iS the proportion 
investment expenditures permitted aS additional deduction 
from taxable income; z iS the discounted value of the 
Stream of depreciation charges generated by a peSo of 
investment; q iS the price of the capital goo;ds an;d u iS 
the corporate income tax rate. 
To trace the effect of any given incentive on c, we 
first determine which of : the variables on the > right-hand 
Side of (7) is affected by the Said incentive and then we 
differentiate (7) with reSpect to the explanatory variable 
in question (See Appendix 1). Next, the proportional change 
in the uSer cost of capital iS computed numerically given 
the aSSumed values of the different variables. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the impact of 
Selected major incentives on the uSer cost of capital. The 
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investment allowance, followed by the income tax holiday 
and the duty-free importation of capital introduce 
marked reductions in the uSer coSt of capital. The negative 
increments in the uSer coSt of capital due to theSe 
incentives vary from 1 to 64 percent. Furthermore, we note 
the absence of employment-based incentives that will 
effectively counteract the implied capital bias of the other 
incentives. Neoclassical theory SuggeSt that this 
additional distortion in relative factor prices in the ASEAN 
countries iS likely to result in increased capital 
intensity. UnleSS theSe countries can Show that Such a 
policy-originating bias compensates for other biaSeS in the 
economic SyStem, tax theory dictates that theSe countries 
Should Search for more factor-neutral incentives. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the impact of the investment 
incentives on the internal rate of return indicate that 
ASEAN countries are to a large extent aS competitive with 
each other before incentives aS after incentives. At the 
Same time* the income tax holiday is the Single moSt 
important incentive offered by moSt ASEAN countries. TheSe 
findings SuggeSt the following recommendations. FirSt, 
ASEAN countries Should not try to outbid each other in 
attracting foreign capital to their ShoreS by attempting to 
provide more generous incentives than their neighbors. 
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Annex Table 2 
Investient Incentives in ASEAN Countries 
Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand 
1. Tai Exemptions 
A. Incoie Tax Exemption fron 351 
incoie tax for 6 
years from cosiercial 
operation for pioneer 
fins and 4 years for 
non-pioneer firis, 
extendible for another 
year (but not to exceed 
8 years) in each of the 
following cases: 
(a) project meets 
prescribed capital-
labor ratio; (b) uti-
lization of indigenous 
raw materials; (c) net 
foreign exchange earnings 
of at least OS$500,000.00 
annually during the first 
three years of operation. 
For expanding firis, the 
exeiption shall be pro-
portionate to their expan-
sions for a period of 3 
years from comercial 
operations. 
None Exemption from Exeiption froi Exeiption froi 30X 
incoie tax of 331 tax on or 401 corporate 
4015, develop- profits for a incoie tax for a 
ment tax of period of 5-10 period of 3 to 8 
5? and excess years for years depending on 
profit tax of pioneer status size, type of 
31 for 5 years firis. This industry & uuiber 
from production also applies to of eiployees. For 
date extendible increiental firis in the 
for another 5 incoie of investient 
years for expansion promotion zone, 
pioneer status projects. reduction of 501 of 
firms. Dividends corp. incoae tax 
paid from eiempt for 5 years after 
income are also the normal tax 
exempt from tai holiday given 
in the hands of above. 
stockholders. 
They do not Stand to gain much by following this strategy. 
In fact, it iS likely that they will end up aS net loSerS. 
Second, it will benefit the ASEAN group,if they cooperate 
with each other for the purpose of harmonizing their 
investment incentives. Third, the benefits of the tax 
holiday do not accrue to the individual investors unleSS 
tax Sparing arrangements between the hoSt country and the 
capital exporting countries are in place. This implies that 
the ASEAN countries Should initiate, individually or aS a 
group, negotiations with the capital exporting countries to 
remedy the anomalous Situation of the ASEAN countries 
transfering revenues to the Treasuries of the more developed 
economies. Otherwise, the ASEAN countries Should SeriouSly 
reconsider providing the tax holiday to foreign investors. 
Estimates of the impact of the investment incentives 
of the ASEAN countries on the uSer cost capital SuggeSt that 
the more important incentives offered by theSe countries are 
non-neutral with reSpect to relative factor prices. UnleSS 
this distortion iS introduced into the SyStem by design, 
i.e., for the purpose of compensating for genuine market 
failures and/or policy originating distortions that work in 
the opposite direction, and not by accident, then the 
incentives currently granted by the ASEAN countries iS 
| v 
likely to reSult in a worsening of the resource allocation 
in theSe economies. What iS implied iS the need to 
formulate more neutral incentives. 
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NOTES: 
1/ 
For instance, while it is common for investment 
legislations to limit foreign ownership in moSt activities 
to x percent it iS al'so widespread practice to relax theSe 
regulation's for foreign entrepreneurs proposing to engage in 
"pioneer" projects and/or export production. Furthermore, 
Some countries allow foreigners to own more than x percent 
of the equity in the first So many years of operation 
provided they agree to diveSt the difference within a 
Specified period of time. 
2/ 
Brunei iS not included in this Study because of the 
inavailabili ty of complete data. 
3/ 
dj iS usually a function of q. For example, if Straight-
line depreciation iS followed then dj= q(l+tm)/n. 
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Appendix 
Investment Incentives and USer CoSt of Capital 
The concept of the uSer coSt of capital and i tS relationship 
to tax policy parameters is well defined within the neoclassical 
theory of capital accumulation originally formulated by Hall and 
JorgenSon (1967) which aSSumeS that firms maximize the net 
present value of net revenue after tax. Here, the uSer coSt of 
capital or the implicit rental of one unit of capital Service per 
unit of time is defined ir the following equation: 
q(i+D) (1-ku-uz) 
(1-u) ( 1 ) 
where r is the rate of interest, 
d iS the rate of replacement of capital Stock, 
k is the proportion of investment expenditures 
permitted aS additional deduction from 
taxable income, 
z is the discounted value of the Stream of 
depreciation charges generated by a peSo of 
investment, 
q iS the price of capital goods, and 
u is the corporate income tax rate. 
To trace the effect of any given incentive on c, we first 
determine which of the variables on the right hand Side of (1) iS 
affected by the Said incentive and then we differentiate (1) with 
respect to the explanatory variable in question. 
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Thuis, to evaluate the effect of the accelerated depreciation 
provision on the uSer coSt of capital, equation (1) is 
differentiated with respect to z: 
- (i +D) q u 
Ac = — Az (2) 
(1-u) 
Without the accelerated depreciation provision z', the 
present value of the Stream of depreciation charges, would be 
n (1/n) 
0 j=l j 
(1+i) 
if Straight-line depreciation iS followed. 
If accelerated depreciation is allowed, 
n b 
z ~ T, j 1 — 
j 
(1+i) 
where b ife the amount of depreciation charges allowed in year j j 
for every peSo, of investment. 
AlSo, in' order to Study the effect of the tax 
reduction/exemption on imported capital equipment, we 
differentiate (1) with respect to q: 
(i+D) (l-ku-uz)Aq 
(1-u) 
We note that Ac/c = Aq/q. 
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Now, with full exemption from tax<sS and duties on imported 
capital, 
Aq 
q 
tm 
(1+tm) 
(4) 
Aq 
q 
. 5tm 
(1+tm) 
(5) 
Similarly, to trace the effect of the investment allowance 
on the uSer cost of capital, we differentiate (1) with respect to 
k to obtain: 
-qu(i+D) 
Ac .= Ak. 
(1-u) 
1(6) 
Without this provision clauSe, k = 0; with this incentive k 
ranges from zero to 1.0. 
Finally, the impact of the income tax holiday on the user 
coSt of capital may be aSSeSSed by differentiating (1) with 
reSpect to u: 
Ac 
q(i+D) (k+z) c 
(i-u) (i-u) 
Au (7) 
To evaluate Au, we Should firSt solve for the value of u 
uniformly applicable to the whole n-year period that will result 
the Same pre-tax profit stream, IRR aS that obtaining, from a 
tax holiday Situation. 
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